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Decentralized trust management is used as a referral benchmark for assisting decision making by human or
intelligence machines in open collaborative systems. During any given period of time, each participant may
only interact with a few of other participants. Simply relying on direct trust may frequently resort to random
team formation. Thus, trust aggregation becomes critical. It can leverage decentralized trust management
to learn about indirect trust of every participant based on past transaction experiences. This paper presents
alternative designs of decentralized trust management and their efficiency and robustness from three per-
spectives. First, we study the risk factors and adverse effects of six common threat models. Second, we review
the representative trust aggregation models and trust metrics. Third, we present an in-depth analysis and
comparison of these reference trust aggregation methods with respect to effectiveness and robustness. We
show our comparative study results through formal analysis and experimental evaluation. This comprehen-
sive study advances the understanding of adverse effects of present and future threats and the robustness of
different trust metrics. It may also serve as a guideline for research and development of next generation trust
aggregation algorithms and services in the anticipation of risk factors and mischievous threats.
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frameworks; • Information systems→ Collaborative and social computing systems and tools.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Trust is an abstract, multi-faceted and subjective concept [Liu and Loper 2018]. Trust has been
investigated in multiple disciplines in addition to computer science, ranging from business, phi-
losophy, social science. Researchers from different domains agree with the fundamental definition
of trust, i.e., trust describes an anticipation/trustworthiness level of an individual (as a human be-
ing or an intelligence machine). Trust is often derived from certain feedback ratings through trust
aggregation. For example, Gambetta [1998] presented trust as the subjective probability in social
science that a trustor anticipated a trustee to execute an action beneficial to her/him. Lahno [1999]
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introduced the philosophy of distrust as the betrayal of moral behavior. In economics, trust is re-
flected by the decision to maximize the trustor’s interest by trading off between the potential risks
and the possible utility gains [Cho et al. 2015]. In computer science, many research branches have
adopted trust to mitigate various threats and risks through tracking and leveraging historical in-
teraction experiences in open computing systems and networks. Trust is regarded as an essential
pillar for our digital economy and our cyber infrastructure [Liu and Loper 2018].
Trust management refers to managing trust in a computing system, including defining trust,
identifying the elements that establish trust, and mechanisms for trust computation, trust propaga-
tion, trust aggregation, trust data storage as well as the usage models of trust and trust enhanced
service provisioning. One can provide the above functionalities using a centralized computing
architecture or a decentralized computing architecture or a hybrid of centralized and decentral-
ized computing architectures, which allows certain trust functionality to be implemented and
supported using distributed computing platforms and distributed computation algorithms. De-
centralized trust management refers to managing trust in either fully decentralized computing
systems or a hybrid of centralized and decentralized computing systems.
Over the last decade, trust management has penetrated diverse collaborative networked comput-
ing systems, ranging from peer to peer and eCommence, social networks and online community,
cloud and edge computing, mobile ad hoc networks and wireless sensor networks, to crowdsourc-
ing, multi-agent and Internet of things (IoTs) [Liu et al. 2016].
Peer-to-PeerTrust.Trust management in Peer-to-Peer systems has been studied formore than
two decades [Fan et al. 2017; Jøsang and Ismail 2002; Kamvar et al. 2003; Su et al. 2015; Xiong and Liu
2004] and surveyed [Jøsang et al. 2007; Suryanarayana and Taylor 2004] in the context of decen-
tralized overlay networks and applications. Suryanarayana and Taylor [2004] compared trust met-
rics from trust attributes and discovery mechanism. Jøsang e al. [2007] summarized a number of
main concerns in establishing and utilizing trust, such as low incentive for providing ratings, bi-
ases toward positive feedback, colluding participants, unfair feedback ratings from mischievous
participants, changing identities, etc.
Multi-Agent Trust. Trust management in a multi-agent system (MAS) utilizes trust to improve
the collaboration among multiple autonomous agents in accomplishing a task. Balaji and Srini-
vasan [2010] defined the trust of an agent in terms of autonomy, inferential capability, responsive-
ness and social behavior. Granatyr et al. [2015] reviewed trust models for MAS by analyzing a set
of trust dimensions, such as trust semantics, trust preference, delegation, risk measure, incentive
feedback, initial trust, open environment, hard security threats and requirements, and identified
the linking between trust dimensions and types of interactions, such as coalition, argumentation,
negotiation and recommendation. Pinyol and Sabater-Mir [2013] reviewed trust metrics in terms
of trust cognition, procedure and generality. Yu et al. [2013] reviewed existing trust metrics from
a game theoretic perspective. Braga et al. [2018] unveiled some characteristics of trust, such as
the usage of multiple input sources, cheating assumptions, provision of procedural and cognition
concepts.
SocialNetworkTrust.Trust management in social networks and online communities has been
an active research in the last decade [Caverlee et al. 2010; Jiang et al. 2015; Wang and Wu 2011].
Caverlee et al. [2010] proposed social incentives with personalized similarity to improve the aggre-
gation of reputation trust in a large-scale social network in which participants often did not know
each other a priori. Sherchan et al. [2013] surveyed several critical attributes of social trust, such as
dynamic, propagative, non-transitive properties, interaction behaviors, and historical experiences.
Jiang et al. [2016a] reviewed the graph-based trust evaluation for online social networks (OSNs) in
two broad categories: graph simplification-based approaches and graph analogy-based approaches.
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Jiang et al. [2015] also proposed another work to focus on 1-hop recommender selection problems
in OSNs, e.g. selecting all/a fixed number of/a fixed proportion of/topm qualified neighbors.
Mobil andWirelessAdHocNetwork Trust.Trust is a popular mechanism for secure routing
in mobile and wireless ad hoc networks (MANETs). Zhang et al. [2010] incorporated trust metrics
into the routing protocol in wireless ad hoc networks, and provided a theoretical analysis in the per-
spectives of correctness, optimality and inter-operativity. Movahedi et al. [2016] reviewed several
trust frameworks to tackle the bad-mouthing attack and double-face attack. Several survey articles
[Agrawal and Verma 2016; Cho et al. 2011; Govindan and Mohapatra 2012; Tangade and Manvi
2013] reviewed trust metrics for MANETs and presented a more comprehensive categorization
of potential attacks, such as routing loop attack, wormhole attack, blackhole attack, grayhole at-
tack, DoS attack, on-off attack, package modification/insertion, incomplete information, selective
misbehaving attack, conflicting behavior attack, etc. These attacks enlarge our horizon on threats
and vulnerability risks, and provide the basis for the verification of trust management.
Cloud Computing Trust. Noor et al. [2013] classified trust management in cloud computing
into four categories with respect to the roles of service requester and service provider: (i) policy; (ii)
recommendation; (iii) reputation; and (iv) prediction. Ahmed et al. [2019] presented a trust eval-
uation survey for the cross-cloud federation, namely a federation comprised of unknown cloud
service providers with heterogeneous infrastructures sharing resource for a limited period. It ar-
gued the overall requirements for trust evaluation should include the special requirement from
cross-cloud federation, encompassing the architecture and operational principles of federation.
Trust and Cryptography. Kerrache et al. [2016] proposed an adversary-oriented survey on
trust and cryptography for vehicular network in terms of security communication, safety appli-
cation and infotainment application. The security communication mainly contained certificate
replication attack, eavesdropping attack and vehicle/driver privacy attack. The safety application
primarily included denial of service (DoS), jamming attack, coalition and platooning attack and
betrayal attack. The infotainment application mainly involved replayed/altered/injected message
attack and illusion attack, in addition to the common attacks, such as masquerading attack and im-
personation attack, Sybil attack, and GPS position faking attack, timing attack and black-hole/gray-
hole attacks.
Trust from Multi-disciplinary Research. Trust has been a common theme from a multi-
disciplinary perspective. Cho et al. [2015] surveyed composite trust through deriving trust factors
from communication, information, society and cognition, and discussed trust in a comprehensive
extent, covering artificial intelligence, human computer interaction, data fusion, human-machine
fusion, computer networking and network security, data mining and automation.
Contributions and Scope. Comparing with existing surveys on trust management in different
subject areas above, our paper presents three unique contributions: (1) We provide an in-depth
characterization of the inherent vulnerabilities and robustness of existing trust metrics through
multi-dimensional analysis and extensive experiments, in addition to the root-cause investigation.
(2) We formalize the attack cost and the adverse effect using six representative threat models for
risk analysis and trust robustness evaluation with comprehensive experimental verification. (3) By
taking into account direct trust aggregation and various trust propagation kernels, we summarize
the existing trust metrics into six classifications, and evaluate their robustness and adaptability
against the six threat models.
In short, this survey focuses on integrating threat models with trust management and provides
an in-depth study of fundamental factors for trust establishment, trust propagation, and trust util-
ity in the presence of six categories of common risks and threats. It can serve as a guideline for
research and development of next generation trust aggregation algorithms and assist human or
ACM Comput. Surv., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2019.
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intelligence machines to leverage trust management for making decisions in the anticipation of
various risk factors and mischievous threats.
First, we introduce how to establish direct trust among individual participants in an interactive
network. We review different methods to derive indirect trust from direct trust information, and
introduce common reference model for trust establishment, such as honest/dishonest rating, non-
creditable rating, feedback credibility-weighted (FCW) direct trust, uniformly distributed trust
propagation and threshold-controlled trust propagation kernels.
Second, we categorize common threats and risks emerged in trust management for diverse inter-
active networks into six types of threat models to characterize six differential types of mischievous
adversaries. We quantitatively infer the adverse effect and attack cost for each threat model with
experimental analysis and demonstration.
Third, we provide an in-depth analytical comparison of the state of the art trust research from
two core-components of decentralized trust management systems: direct trust aggregation and
trust propagation kernel design. We study the inherent vulnerabilities of existing trust metrics and
evaluate their attack resilience in the context of the six threat models. In addition, we summarize
existing trust metrics into six categories based on different trust propagation kernels and direct
trust aggregation fashions.
Organization. The rest of this survey paper is organized as follows. We first describe and com-
pare the state of the art research in trust management from direct trust aggregation and indirect
trust aggregation in Section 2 and Section 3 respectively. Then we describe and categorize attacks
and risks into six threat models and present quantitative analysis of the adverse effect and attack
cost for the six threat models in Section 4. We compare different trust aggregation kernels and
study the root-causes of their vulnerabilities in the presence of the six threat models in Section
5 and provide design principle of decentralized trust management in Section 6. We describe trust
applications in edge computing, blockchain and trust data storage in Section 7, and conclude this
survey in Section 8.
2 DIRECT TRUST ESTABLISHMENT
2.1 Transactions and Interactions in Distributed Open Systems
We can broadly classify distributed networked systems into four categories: (1) distributed clients
and centralized servers; (2) distributed clients and distributed servers, and no direct communica-
tions between distributed clients; (3) the hybrid, supporting client-server communication in both
peer to peer among distributed clients in addition to those from clients to centralized severs or
distributed servers; and (4) the peer to peer decentralized networked system, where no centralized
servers are supported and all client-server communications are done among distributed nodes
that serve dual roles of client and server. Web service provisioning from enterprises, such as Ama-
zon, Uber, Airbnb, would belong to the distributed networked systems of type (1) or type (2), and
the systems of type (1) and type (2) offer centralized services to a large population of distributed
clients. Skype and WeChat are examples of type (3) and the systems of type (3) provide both cen-
tralized servers and decentralized servers as their service provisioning platforms. Bitcoin and Tor
are representative peer to peer systems of type (4) and the systems of type (4) have no centralized
management and participants of the type (4) systems form a peer to peer overlay network with
decentralized routing protocols (e.g., such as neighbor based broadcast) to reach the rest of the
network and share resources with, or provide services to, the other participants in the network.
In this paper we primarily focus on decentralized trust management in distributed networked
systems of type (3) and type (4). By decentralized trust management, we mean that the majority
ACM Comput. Surv., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2019.
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of the trust management functionalities, such as trust establishment, trust computation, trust ag-
gregation, trust propagation, will be provided using a decentralized computing architecture. For
instance, a participant in an open network can issue a query service to the network as a client
to search for a resource, some other participants in the network may respond and provide the
resource as the server. Considering the dynamics of open networks, participants may join or de-
part the network randomly, and the network structure is continuously changing over time. Thus,
different requests may require different sets of participants to work together for effective service
provisioning. Assuming each request is being served by one sever even whenmultiple participants
may be able to provide the same service. We refer to each service interaction with the completion
of a service request as a transaction query between a pair of participants, one as a client and the
other as a server. Once one transaction is accomplished, the client participant may give its feed-
back rating on the server participant with respect to the quality of the transaction queryQ . Within
open networks, each participant can be a client or a server to aQ and also can be a feedback rater
if it is a client participant for Q or a feedback rating receiver if it is a server participant.
Trust management in an open system can also be categorized into three categories based on
the three types of interaction patterns: Human to Human (H2H), Human to Machine (H2M) or
Machine to Machine (M2M).
Human-to-Human (H2H).H2H trust represents the trustworthy relationship among humans
in a physical or virtual community, in which individuals employ a computer-assisted networked
system to establish interaction among or with friends and families, as well as unknown individ-
uals in social, physical or virtual community. The direct trust for a pair of participants in such a
community reflects the actual interactions driven by common social or business interest, direct or
indirect friendship through shared background or experiences, etc. It heavily reflects the human
attributes, e.g., emotion, intimacy and mutual reciprocity [Granovetter 1973]. H2H trust manage-
ment illuminates the complex trustworthiness relationships in a variety of disciplines, including
anthropology [Sherchan et al. 2013], sociology [Golbeck 2005, 2006a,b], economics [Xiong and Liu
2003; Zhang et al. 2015], social psychology [Cook et al. 2005; Rotter 1967] and organizational stud-
ies [Jackson 1999].
Human-to-Machine (H2M). H2M trust describes the trustworthiness between humans and
machine hosted services in a computer-aided networked system. H2M trust management can be
regarded as an interface between human consumers and machine-supported services, which on
one hand assists consumers to select trustworthy services, and on the other hand, prevents con-
sumers from getting untrusted services or blocks attacks to the service hosting system. Noor et
al. [2016] proposed to aggregate the consumers’ feedback ratings on cloud services. Habib et al.
[2011] proposed a trust mechanism to guarantee clients to receive only trustworthy cloud services.
Hwang and Li [2010] built a trust-based cloud service architecture to protect both cloud providers
and consumers. Li et al. [2010] proposed a trust-aware service brokering system to assist the se-
lection of trustworthy cloud services.
Machine-to-Machine (M2M).M2M trust management refers to the mechanisms that measure
and manage the trustworthiness of the functionalities performed by the participants of the open
networked system, which are typically software agents hosted on the network nodes (virtual or
physical machines). When the pair of communicating nodes can accomplish the intended trans-
action with an expected result [Liu et al. 2016], the client machine can provide a good feedback
rating for the server machine based on the expected behavior, typically defined by the trust model
in the form of trust policies. Walter et al. [2009] proposed a trust-based recommendation approach
to assist the selection of well-behaved vehicles on demand. Tan et al. [2016] proposed a trust man-
agement scheme to secure the data plane of ad-hoc networks. Nitti et al. [2014] proposed to use
trust metrics to assist the establishment of trustworthy IoTs.
ACM Comput. Surv., Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2019.
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In this paper, althoughwe focus primarily on decentralized trust management in machine to ma-
chine communication scenarios, many of the design principles and trust management algorithms
such as trust aggregation and trust propagation kernels can be easily adapted to the H2M and H2H
trust management systems.
2.2 Direct Trust with Local Trust Aggregation
Generally, the feedback rating is positive if the transaction query is satisfied, or negative if unsat-
isfied. Nevertheless, the emergence of strategically mischievous participants (SMPs) breaks this
routine feedback pattern, i.e. the SMPs on the one hand provide high-quality transaction queries
to get honest (positive) ratings from other service receivers as server participants, but oppositely
give dishonest (negative) feedback ratings to other service providers as client participants ignor-
ing whatever the transaction queries are satisfied or unsatisfied [Fan et al. 2012, 2017; Kamvar et al.
2003; Su et al. 2013]. In addition, the query transaction may fail with non-response, or delivering
faulty/low-quality results due to unintended reasons, such as network bandwidth jitter, cooling-
induced cloud server downtime, etc. Upon the above analysis, we know that the mischievous be-
havior can be studied from i) two-facet intended manners, i.e. service-based misbehaved manipula-
tion, rating-based misbehaved manipulation; and ii) one unintended manner, i.e. system/network
reliability factors-induced natural failure.
Service-based Feedback Rating. Normally, we refer the feedback that a service provider re-
ceives a positive/negative rating while providing an authentic/inauthentic service as honest rating.
Inversely, we refer the feedback that a service provider receives a negative/positive rating while
providing an authentic/inauthentic service as dishonest rating. Each individual can alternately play
the two roles during the interactions, i.e. service provider (a.k.a. server participant) and service
consumer (a.k.a. client participant). The vicious participants can be categorized as independently
mischievous, collusively mischievous, randomly mischievous, occasionally mischievous and per-
sistently mischievous [Fan et al. 2017]. In fact, the rating is reflected by feedback rater being honest
or dishonest, being independently or collusively dishonest, being randomly or occasionally dishon-
est or persistently dishonest, but all about the rater’s perception on the query transaction quality.
The different categories of mischievous participants may have some overlap in terms of mali-
cious manipulation, such as they all provide inauthentic services and dishonest feedback ratings,
but for different threat models the malicious behaviors may be naively malicious or strategically
malicious in serving or rating or both. Prior to establishing direct trust, we first give some basic
definitions.
Definition 2.1 (Honest Rating). The rating is strictly subject to the query transaction quality, i.e.
positive rating for authentic service and negative rating for inauthentic service. It can be trusted
by the network as a local trust metric for the feedback receiver.
Definition 2.2 (Dishonest Rating). The rating is alternatively subject to the transaction target
rather than the truthful query transaction quality, i.e. positive rating for colluding participant and
negative rating for routine participant. It ought to be weighted by feedback credibility prior to
being trusted by the network.
Usually, 5% dishonest ratings are allowed to reflect the randomly or occasionally dishonest be-
havior of an honest rater [Fan et al. 2017; Kamvar et al. 2003] due to some unintended reasons. The
direct trust from a participant pi to another participant pj based on one-time transaction can be
demonstrated using binary or multiscale rating. For example, the pioneering trust metric Eigen-
Trust [Kamvar et al. 2003] defined the direct trust for a pair of transacted participants using binary
rating {-1, +1}, tr (pi ,pj )=-1 denoted a negative rating from pi to pj , and tr (pi ,pj )=+1 represented a
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positive rating. The heritage EigenTrust++ [Fan et al. 2012] and GroupTrust [Fan et al. 2017], both
employed this kind of binary rating. Differently, ServiceTrust [Su et al. 2013] and ServiceTrust++
[Su et al. 2015] utilized the multiscale rating {-1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} indicating bad, no-rating, neutral,
fair, good, very good and excellent query transaction respectively.
For SMPs, one smart way to subvert the system is to firstly collect positive ratings to yield high
trust through providing authentic services, then utilize the advantage of gained trust to participate
the query transactions to provide inauthentic services. Hence, a reliable trust metric ought to take
the historical feedback information into account, i.e. recent feedback ratings should be more valu-
able and historical feedback ratings should be less valuable. The studies [Li and Wang 2008; Li et al.
2009; Wang and Li 2011; Zacharia and Maes 2000] also confirmed the ratings in a recent time pe-
riod weighted more than the former emerged ratings. In this way, once SMPs are found to change
their transactional behaviors from honestly providing authentic services to dishonestly offering
inauthentic services, their trust would be degraded shortly using weight parameter even they pos-
sessed high trust already. For instance, Li et al. [2011] used the weight decimal [0, 1] manner to
distinguish the different-time feedback ratings for personal rating and indirect recommendation.
For a given period of time interval [t1, tn], the direct trust level from pi to pj can be calculated as:
trh(pi ,pj )
(ti )
= wti · tr (pi ,pj )
(ti ) ti ∈ [t1, tn], (1)
wherewti set as a
tn−ti (0 < a ≤ 1) is the weight of the rating tr (pi ,pj )(ti ) at time ti .
Rating-based Feedback Rating. The SMPs can indeed earn high trust by aggregating honest
positive ratings from good participants via serving authentic resources and dishonest positive
rating from their colluders. This violates the initial aim of trust metrics at degrading the trust
levels of mischievous participants. Thus only utilizing honest rating is inadequate for the SMPs,
we need further explore creditable rating to amend the deficiency.
Definition 2.3 (Creditable Rating). The rating for a single feedback rater or pairwise feedback
rating score is integrated by feedback credibility factor.
Oppositely, non-creditable rating can be defined as:
Definition 2.4 (Non-creditable Rating). The rating for a single feedback rater or pairwise feedback
rating score is always negative without referring to any creditable factor.
Upon Definition 2.3, we can further study the creditable ratings from two levels, namely feed-
back rater and feedback rating score.
Definition 2.5 (Feedback Rater Level Credibility). The interactive system endows each feedback
rater a credibility weight for local trust aggregation.
Definition 2.6 (Feedback Rating Score Level Credibility). The interactive system endows each feed-
back rating score over a pair of transacted participants a credibility weight for local trust aggrega-
tion.
Xiong and Liu [2004] had proposed two kinds of credibility measure fashions from the stand-
points of feedback rater level and feedback rating score level. The former (PeerTrustTVM) set
self-trust as credibility weight, which interpreted the feedback rating of a trustworthy participant
possessed more credibility than that of an untrustworthy participant.
Crpi =
T (pi )∑ |tr (pj ) |
pm=1
T (pm)
pi ∈ tr (pj ), (2)
where tr (pj ) represented the set of participants that had transactions with pj , T (pi ) denoted the
trust value of pi . The latter (PeerTrustPSM) employed feedback similarity as credibility factor,
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the mischievous participants had low feedback similarity with good participants due to greatly
different ratings to commonly transacted participants.
Crpipk =
sim(pi,pk )∑ |tr (pj ) |
pm=1
sim(pi ,pm)
pi ,pk ∈ tr (pj ), (3)
sim(pv,pw ) = 1 −
©­­­«
∑
px ∈comn(pv ,pw )
(
∑
|tr (pv ,px ) |
tr (pv ,px )
|tr (pv ,px ) |
−
∑
|tr (pw ,px ) |
tr (pw ,px )
|tr (pw ,px ) |
)2
|comn(pv ,pw )|
ª®®®¬
1
2
, (4)
where sim(pv ,pw )was the feedback similarity through inferring the standard deviation of feedback
ratings to the commonly rated participants comn(pv ,pw ). Similarly, GroupTrust [Fan et al. 2017]
used exponential function to define feedback rating score level credibility:
Cr ′pipj = exp{1 −
1
sim(pi ,pj )
}. (5)
RawLocal TrustAggregation.The direct trust over each pair of transacted participants can be
calculated via local trust aggregation. At present, the commonly used aggregating fashions can be
roughly classified into two manners: i) transaction success ratio; and ii) beta function probability
expectation. Intuitively, the transaction success ratio-employed direct trust from pi to pj can be
defined as:
spipj =
{
δpi pj
δpi pj +σpi pj +1
σpi pj
δpi pj +σpi pj +1
≤ θ
1
2 otherwise
, (6)
where θ implies good participants misbehave in a tiny probability due to system reliability factors-
induced natural failure, usually set as 5% [Fan et al. 2012; Kamvar et al. 2003; Su et al. 2013]. δpipj
denotes the number of successful transactions between pi and pj , σpipj is the number of unsuccess-
ful transactions.
The beta probability density functions [Jøsang and Ismail 2002; Klos and Alkemade 2005;Walter et al.
2009] can be expressed via gamma function:
f (p |α , β) =
Γ(α + β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
ρα−1(1 − ρ)β−1, (7)
where α , β>0, and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, ρ , 0 if α < 1 and ρ , 1 if β < 1. At present, scholars straightly define
the direct trust as the probability expectation of beta distribution:
s
β
pipj = α/(α + β) = (δpipj + 1)/(δpipj + σpipj + 2), (8)
where α = δpipj+1, β = σpipj+1. Essentially, this beta function based direct trust reflects the trans-
action success ratio as well. For easy understanding, we call both spipj and s
β
pipj as raw direct trust
with different local trust aggregation fashions given they only adopt positive and negative ratings
to produce direct trust for a pair of transacted participants.
Without a doubt, the local trust aggregation can pull-in somemore crucial impact factors, e.g. the
aforementioned history feedback factor and feedback credibility. Naturally, referring to historical
feedback factor, the local trust aggregation shpipj can be defined as:
shpipj =
∑n
i=1 trh(pi ,pj )
(ti )∑n
i=1wti
ti ∈ [t1, tn]. (9)
Furthermore, referring to feedback credibility factor we can define the FCW direct trust.
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Definition 2.7 (Feedback Credibility-Weighted Direct Trust). The direct trust over each pair of
transacted participants is yielded through integrating creditable trust factors from the viewpoint
of a single feedback rater or pairwise feedback rating score.
Accordingly, the feedback rater level credibility-based direct trust s ′Crpipj is defined as:
s ′
Cr
pipj
= Crpi · spipj pi ∈ tr (pj ). (10)
The pairwise feedback rating score level credibility-based direct trust sCrpipj (s
Cr ′
pipj
) is defined using
feedback similarity among the two transacted participants [Fan et al. 2017]:
sCr
′
pipj
= Cr ′pipj · spipj pi ,pj ∈ tr (pk ), (11)
or using feedback similarity of reference third-party participants [Xiong and Liu 2004]:
sCrpipj = Crpipk · spkpj pk ,pi ∈ tr (pj ). (12)
Trust itself is a complex and subjective concept impacted by multiple factors with respect to
the diversities of misbehaved participants, thereby, for mischievous participants especially SMPs,
it is hard to constrain them from gaining high direct trust from honestly transacted participants.
Therefore, an effective trust metric need take into account these impact factors to infer a multi-
perspective and rational direct trust for each two transacted participants.
3 INDIRECT TRUST WITH NETWORK-BASED TRUST AGGREGATION
3.1 Network-Scoped Trust Aggregation
The baseline inference on indirect trust from participants pu to pv is to recursively aggregate the
third-party participant pk ’s direct trust placed onpv within the holistic network, i.e.
∑
pk
spupk · spkpv
or
∑
pk
sCrpupk · s
Cr
pkpv
. For an interactive network with Nnet participants, the network-scoped trust can
be derived using the power iteration of adjacentmatrix in which each element stands for the direct
trust value over each pair of participants.
T
(k+1)
G
= MT ·T
(k)
G
, (13)
where T (k+1)G denotes the (k+1)th iteration trust vector of Nnet participants, M is the normalized
direct trust matrix:mpupv=spupv /
∑
pm spupm , if
∑
pm spupm ,0, otherwise mpupv =0. This iteration
operation in fact is also a trust propagation/diffusion process hop by hop, k controls the propagat-
ing scope of trust. Obviously, each participant’s trust can be propagated to thewhole network with
certain iteration rounds. Inversely, each participant can also receive trust from the whole network.
Thus, we define the global trust as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Global Trust). We define the trust score computed by indirect trust aggregation
over the entire network through the network topology as the global trust from one participant pu
to another participant pv , provided that pv is reachable from pu by network traversal. The global
trust value can be viewed as the comprehensive confidence that the entire network as a community
places on the participant pv via the view of pu .
EigenTrust [Kamvar et al. 2003] is the first to introduce the use of the pre-trusted nodes as the
authority participants in order to address the "cold start" problem. Taking into account the pre-
trusted participants, the authors defined the eigenvector-based global trust as:
T
(k+1)
G
= (1 − ε) ·MT ·T (k)
G
+ ε ·
−→
P , (14)
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where ε denoted the probability a stranger or newcomer would like to trust the system-generated
pre-trusted participants P , ppj=1/|P | if participant pj∈P , otherwise ppj=0.
3.2 Trust Propagation Kernel
From Formula (14), we know that an individual’s global trust is aggregated through asking the
other participants’ feedback ratings placed on this individual. We define this kind of trust propa-
gation kernel as uniformly distributed trust propagation.
Definition 3.2 (Uniformly Distributed Trust Propagation, UDTP). For each participant, it propa-
gates self-global trust to all the neighboring participants in the light of direct trust values placed
on the neighboring participants.
Although this UDTP kernel is the core to aggregate global trust at present, it confronts rigor-
ous inherent vulnerabilities. It is this UDTP kernel that enhances the global trust scores of SMPs,
i.e. they can repeatedly gain high trust deriving from authentic-service provision activities. If no
mischievous participant exists, this UDTP kernel can yield correct and rational trust level for each
participant. To address the vulnerability, a threshold-controlled trust propagation kernel was pro-
posed in [Fan et al. 2017; Su et al. 2015].
Definition 3.3 (Threshold-Controlled Trust Propagation, TCTP). For a participant, the decision
whether it can propagate trust to its neighboring participants strictly depends on the system-
inferred critical threshold.
Generally, TCTP kernel adopts the direct trust to compare with the system-inferred critical
threshold [Fan et al. 2017; Su et al. 2015], if larger, trust propagation is permitted, otherwise trust
propagation is blocked. Appropriately setting on TCTP can validly control trust propagation; oth-
erwise it puts TCTP at a disadvantage, i.e. if the threshold is too low, it cannot block SMPs re-
ceiving trust propagation from good participants; if the threshold is too high, it might block trust
propagation among good participants. An attack resilient trust metric should have the capability
to differentially propagate trust among good and different categories of mischievous participants
rather than simply utilizing UDTP kernel.
4 THREAT MODELS AND ADVERSE EFFECTS
4.1 Reference Threat Models
Massive simple/strategic threats and risks have been penetrating open networked systems, such
as bad-mouthing [Sun et al. 2006], self-promoting [Hoffman et al. 2009], ballot stuffing behavior
[He et al. 2012; Hu et al. 2017], collusively malicious [Fan et al. 2017; Jiang et al. 2016b; Sun et al.
2006], on-off attack [Chae et al. 2015; Sun et al. 2006], Sybil [Liu et al. 2015; Wang et al. 2015], spy
[Fan et al. 2017; Kamvar et al. 2003], black-hole and grey-hole attacks [Kerrache et al. 2016], etc.
For the sake of easy understanding, according to references [Fan et al. 2017; Kamvar et al. 2003;
Su et al. 2015] we summarize these threats and risks as several threat models referring to attack
policies and characteristics. Besides the four representative threat models, we also in advance
propose another two more-sophisticated threat models to support our deep arguments.
Definition 4.1 (Threat Model A-IndependentlyMischievous). Allmischievous participants perform
bad services and dishonest feedbacks independently. Concretely, they provide inauthentic services
when selected as transaction service providers (server participants) and they always offer non-
creditable ratings to other transacted participants ignoring whether the received services are au-
thentic or inauthentic as feedback raters. The mischievous participants in this category always
receive bad ratings from good participants.
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Definition 4.2 (Threat Model B-Collectively Mischievous). All mischievous participants are orga-
nized in a chain to collude with each other. They always give inauthentic services as server partici-
pants, and they always provide dishonest ratings as feedback raters, i.e., giving dishonest (negative)
ratings to good participants but dishonest (positive) ratings to other colluding participants over
the chain. This Threat Model B adds colluding effect on feedback ratings compared to the Threat
Model A.
Definition 4.3 (Threat Model C-Camouflage Collective). All mischievous participants are orga-
nized in a chain to collude mutually. They give authentic services in a probability f when selected
as server participants, and provide dishonest ratings as feedback raters, i.e. giving dishonest (neg-
ative) ratings to good participants but dishonest (positive) ratings to colluding participants in the
chain. The Threat Model C adds a camouflage strategy: Instead of providing bad services all the
time, mischievous participants play camouflage games at a probability f , aiming to cheat the trust
system, i.e., the mischievous camouflage participants will receive honest (positive or negative)
ratings from some good participants and thus gain relatively higher trust through aggregating
positive ratings.
Definition 4.4 (Threat Model D-Group-based Spies). All mischievous participants are divided into
two types: Type B acting like the vicious participants in Threat Model A (provide bad services
and give dishonest feedbacks) and Type D vicious participants do good services but give dishonest
feedbacks. It changes the malicious method of selectively providing good services in Threat Model
C to use a subset ofmischievous participants to provide good service all the time, but give dishonest
feedbacks. It is another malicious strategy intended to cheat the trust system. This threat model
adds another malicious strategy: Type-D participants give negative ratings to good participants but
positive ratings to all Type-B participants.
Definition 4.5 (Threat Model E-Camouflage Collective with Honest Rating). Alike Threat Model
C, all mischievous participants are organized in a chain to collude each other, but they play cam-
ouflage game at both service provisioning and feedback rating. They give authentic services in a
probability f when selected as server participants and will offer honest ratings with probability
η as feedback raters. This is a change to Threat Model C with the goal of providing a third ma-
licious strategy to cheat the trust system: By playing camouflage game also as feedback raters, it
allows the good participants to receive positive ratings from camouflage participants at probability
η, making it hard for the trust system to detect and identify mischievous participants.
Definition 4.6 (Threat Model F-Group-based Spies with Honest Rating). All mischievous partic-
ipants are composed of Type-D participants and Type-B participants. When selected as server
participants, Type-D participants always give authentic services and Type-B participants always
give inauthentic services. On the other hand as feedback raters, the mischievous participants offer
honest ratings with probability γ , that is to say the good participants can receive positive ratings
from mischievous spies with probability γ . This is a change to Threat Model D with the goal of
providing the fourth malicious strategy to cheat the trust system: The good participants can receive
positive ratings from spy participants at probability γ , making it hard for the trust system to detect
and identify mischievous participants.
ThreatModels A-D have been used by some existing trust metrics, e.g. EigenTrust [Kamvar et al.
2003], ServiceTrust [Su et al. 2013], etc. Threat Models E and F are introduced in this survey to
support the most strategically malicious attacks. Threat Models A and B are simple, Threat Models
C and D are somewhat more sophisticated, and Threat Models E and F are most strategically
malicious, as shown in Table 3.
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4.2 Adverse Effect and Cost of Aacks
4.2.1 Aack Cost and Aack Success Ratio. To formally infer adverse effect and attack cost for
each threat model, we first give the definition of attack cost with respect to interactive properties.
Definition 4.7 (Attack Cost). Attack cost is comprehensively reflected by the price themischievous
participants need to pay for launching an attack successfully in terms of the amounts of mis-
chievous participants and dishonest feedback ratings, the numbers of authentic services and hon-
est ratings offered by SMPs.
For each participant, its global trust in fact contains both trustworthiness and untrustworthiness
factors, this is because the direst trust over each pair of transacted participants as the base of
global trust calculation, is inferred using both positive and negative ratings. To interpret adverse
effect, we need separately derive the inherent trust ingredient contribution and distrust ingredient
contribution.
Definition 4.8 (Trust Ingredient). For a participant pi , its trust ingredientTti (pi ) is aggregated by
the honest feedback ratings it received.
Tti (pi ) =
∑
tr (pw ,pi )∈RH
mpwpi ·T (pw ), (15)
where RH is the set of positive feedback ratings offered by good participants or SMPs.
Definition 4.9 (Distrust Ingredient). For a participant pi , its distrust ingredient Tdi (pi ) is aggre-
gated by the dishonest and non-creditable feedback ratings it received.
Tdi (pi ) =
∑
tr (pu ,pi )∈RdH ∪RnH
mpupi ·T (pu ) (16)
where RdH denotes the set of negative ratings offered by collectively mischievous, camouflage and
spy participants in Threat Models B-F, RnH represents the set of non-creditable ratings offered by
independently mischievous participants in Threat Model A.
Next, we utilize trust ingredient and distrust ingredient to define attack success ratio.
Definition 4.10 (Attack Success Ratio). Given an attack target participant pi , once the distrust
ingredient it received is larger than the trust ingredient, that is to say this participant is successfully
attacked. Accordingly, the attack success ratio As(pi ) is defined as:
As(pi ) = Tdi (pi )/Tti (pi ). (17)
Obviously, if the adversary participants want to launch an attack successfully on a target pi ,
they must yield larger distrust ingredient compared to trust ingredient, i.e. As(pi )>1. For clear
description, we show the related notations and presentations in Table 1.
4.2.2 Adverse Effect and Aack Cost of Threat Model A. Based on Formula (17), for independently
mischievous participants, if they attack a target participant pi successfully, the cost must meet the
following condition.∑
tr (pu ,pi )∈RnH
mpupiTG (pu )/
∑
tr (pw ,pi )∈RH
mpwpiTG (pw ) > 1. (18)
We utilize raw direct trust to replace normalized direct trust mpupi , and beta function-based
expectation to interpret direct trust. Thus we can transform Formula (18) into:∑
tr (pu ,pi )∈RnH
1
|tr (pu ,pi )| + 2
·TG (pu) >
∑
tr (pw ,pi )∈RH
|tr (pw ,pi )| + 1
|tr (pw ,pi )| + 2
·TG (pw ). (19)
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Table 1. Notations and presentations
Notation Presentation
Nnet number of system participants (network size)
RdH set of dishonest ratings offered by collective, camouflage and spy attackers
RnH set of non-creditable ratings offered by independent attackers
RH set of honest rating offered by good participants and SMPs
TG (pi ) global trust score of participant pi
Tti (pi ) trust ingredient of participant pi
Tdi (pi ) distrust ingredient of participant pi
TGnet network level average trust of good participants
TMnet network level average trust of mischievous participants
NdH number of participants that offer dishonest ratings
NnH number of participants that offer non-creditable ratings
NH number of participants that offer honest ratings
NC number of camouflage participants launched by Threat Models C and E
ND number of Type-D participants launched by Threat Models D and F
NB number of Type-B participants launched by Threat Models D and F
As transaction increases, the beta function-based direct trust over a pair of good participants pw
and pi will enlarge, we can see that via Formula (19). Inversely, the direct trust over a pair of good
and mischievous participants pu and pi will decline. Thereby, the appropriate time to launch an at-
tack is at the beginning period, otherwise the mischievous participants would pay more cost. Thus,
we calculate the adverse effect and attack cost when the transaction is performed only one-time,
and suppose the feedback employs binary rating. In addition, we assume the number of indepen-
dently mischievous participants is NnH with the network level average trust TMnet , the number
of good participants is NH with the network level average trust TGnet . Thus, we can rewrite the
condition (19) as:
NnH ·
1
1 + 2
·TMnet > NH ·
1 + 1
1 + 2
·TGnet . (20)
Accordingly, the number of mischievous participants is NnH=
( ⌊
2NH ×TGnet /T
M
net
⌋
+ 1
)
. Given
the independency ofmischievous participants, each needs to launch at least one-time non-creditable
rating to the target participant, thus the total non-creditable ratings are at leastNnR=
(⌊
2NH ×TGnet /T
M
net
⌋
+ 1
)
.
4.2.3 Adverse Effect and Aack Cost of Threat Model B. The mischievous participants organize a
chain, and each mischievous participant in the chain would offer a high dishonest rating (1.0) to
its partner. Nevertheless, since these mischievous participants cannot provide authentic services,
they hardly gain positive ratings from good participants, this implies the chain-reinforced function
in fact loses the trust transitivity effect. Thus, we have the following attack success condition.∑
tr (pu ,pi )∈RdH
mpupiTG (pu )/
∑
tr (pw ,pi )∈RH
mpwpiTG (pw ) > 1. (21)
Accordingly, we have that:
NdH ·
1
1 + 2
·TMnet > NH ·
1 + 1
1 + 2
·TGnet . (22)
Thereby, the number of mischievous participants is NdH=
(⌊
2NH ×TGnet /T
M
net
⌋
+ 1
)
. Besides dis-
honest (negative) ratings to target participant, the mischievous participants need give their chain-
based partners dishonest (positive) ratings, the total dishonest ratings areNdR=2·
(⌊
2NH ×TGnet /T
M
net
⌋
+ 1
)
.
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4.2.4 Adverse Effect and Aack Cost of ThreatModel C. The camouflage participants not only form
the reinforced trust-transitivity chain, but they can also provide authentic services with probability
f to gain positive ratings from good participants. We assume the amount of authentic services
provided by one camouflage participant is IH and simultaneously it receives IH positive ratings
from good participants. Thus, we aggregate trust ingredient through received positive ratings:
Tti (pc ) =
∑
tr (pw ,pc )∈RH
|tr (pw ,pc ) |+1
|tr (pw ,pc ) |+2
·TG (pw )
= IH ·
1+1
1+2 ·T
G
net
, (23)
where Tti (pc ) denotes the trust ingredient of camouflage participant pc . We assume the number
of camouflage participants is NC , they in return use gained trust ingredient Tti (pc ) as distrust
ingredient to attack target participant. Thus we can replace condition (22) as:
NC ·
1
1+2 · IH ·
1+1
1+2 ·T
G
net > NH ·
1+1
1+2 ·T
G
net
NC > 3 · NH /IH
. (24)
Given the direct trust over the chain is high (1.0), which implies the camouflage participants as
a community only need one member to provide authentic services to gain positive ratings, this
member in return can propagate its gained trust to its partner along the chain, by analogy, all
camouflage participants can get the same trust value through the chain-based direct trust. There-
fore, the attack cost includes: i) the number of camouflage participants is (⌊3NH /IH ⌋ + 1); ii) the
amount of authentic services provided by camouflage participants is IH ; iii) the dishonest ratings
to target participant are (⌊3NH /IH ⌋ + 1); and iv) as well as the dishonest ratings to partners over
the chain are (⌊3NH /IH ⌋ + 1).
4.2.5 Adverse Effect and Aack Cost of Threat Model D. We assume each Type-D participant pro-
vides IH authentic services and receives IH positive ratings from good participants. According to
Formula (23), we have each Type-D participant’s trust ingredient:
Tti (pD) =
∑
tr (pw ,pc )∈RH
|tr (pw ,pd ) |+1
|tr (pw ,pd ) |+2
·TG (pw )
= IH ·
1+1
1+2 ·T
G
net
, (25)
where Tti (pD ) denotes the trust ingredient of Type-D participant aggregated through gained pos-
itive ratings. Given Type-D participants cooperate with Type-B participants, i.e. Type-D partici-
pants proportionally give each Type-B participant direct trust 1/|NB |. Thus, each Type-B partici-
pant’s trust ingredient can be calculated as:
Tti (pB) = ND ·
1
NB
·Tti (PD )
= ND ·
1
NB
· IH ·
1+1
1+2 ·T
G
net
, (26)
where ND and NB (,0) stand for the numbers of Type-D and Type-B participants. To achieve
attacking target, it must meet the following condition:
ND
1+2 ·Tti (pD ) +
NB
1+2 ·Tti (pB) >
2NH
1+2 ·T
G
net
ND ·
1
1+2 · IH ·
1+1
1+2 ·T
G
net + NB ·
1
1+2 · ND ·
1
NB
· IH ·
1+1
1+2 ·T
G
net > NH ·
1+1
1+2 ·T
G
net
ND >
3NH
2IH
. (27)
Therefore, the attack cost includes: i) Type-D participants’ amount is (⌊3NH /2IH ⌋ + 1), Type-
B participants’ amount is NB ; ii) Type-D participants need to altogether provide good partic-
ipants ((⌊3NH /2IH ⌋ + 1) · IH ) authentic services; iii) offer (⌊3NH /2IH ⌋ + 1) · NB dishonest rat-
ings simultaneously to Type-B participants; and iv) Type-D and Type-B individuals need offer
((⌊3NH /2IH ⌋ + 1) + NB ) dishonest ratings to target participant. From Formula (27), we can see
that the number of Type-B participants does not affect the adverse effect of Type-D individuals,
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they just can be viewed as a trust transitivity bridge to receive Type-D participants’ trust ingredi-
ent to further perform dishonest transactions.
4.2.6 Adverse Effect and Aack Cost of Threat Model E. The camouflage participants not only pro-
vide authentic services with probability f to gain positive ratings as feedback receivers, but also
offer honest ratings with probability η as feedback raters. According to Formula (23), we know the
camouflage participants can gain the trust ingredient Tti (pc ) by contributing IH honest transac-
tions. Since they offer honest ratings with probability η, which means they will propagate trust
ingredient to good participants with proportion η, and trust ingredient to the chain-based mis-
chievous partners with probability (1-η). For the sake of explicitly understanding, we identify the
camouflage participants in the chain as pc1 , pc2 , · · ·, pcNc . Might as well assume the 1st camouflage
participant has provided IH authentic services and gained trust ingredient Tti (pc1) already. Thus,
with the trust transitivity the ith camouflage participant’s trust ingredient can be calculated as:
Tti (pci ) = Tti (pc1) · (1 − η)
(i−1)
. (28)
To meet the attack success condition, we can rewrite the Formula (24) as:
1
1+2 ·Tti (pc1) +
1
1+2 ·Tti (pc2) + · · · +
1
1+2 ·Tti (pcNC ) > NH ·
1+1
1+2 ·T
G
net
1
1+2 · IH ·
1+1
1+2 ·T
G
net · (1 + (1 − η) + · · · + (1 − η)
(NC−1)) > NH ·
1+1
1+2 ·T
G
net
NC > log(1−η)(1 −
3NH ·η
IH
)
. (29)
Alike Threat Model C, only one camouflage participant needs to contribute authentic services,
the others can gain trust ingredient through trust transitivity. The attack cost includes: i) the num-
ber of camouflage participants is
(⌊
log(1−η)(1 − 3NH · η/IH )
⌋
+ 1
)
; ii) the number of authentic ser-
vices is IH ; iii) the amount of dishonest ratings given to target participant is
(⌊
log(1−η)(1 − 3NH · η/IH )
⌋
+ 1
)
;
iv) the dishonest ratings given to mischievous partners are
(⌊
log(1−η)(1 − 3NH · η/IH )
⌋
+ 1
)
; and
v) given the amount of dishonest ratings to the mischievous partners and attack target, in ad-
dition to the probability η, we can derive the total ratings offered by camouflage participants are(⌊
2
(⌊
log(1−η)(1−3NH ·η/IH )
⌋
+1
)
(1−η)
⌋
+ 1
)
, the number of honest ratings is
(⌊
2η ·
(⌊
log(1−η)(1−3NH ·η/IH )
⌋
+1
)
(1−η)
⌋
+ 1
)
.
4.2.7 Adverse Effect and Aack Cost of Threat Model F. The honest ratings offered by spy partic-
ipants mainly influence the trust transitivity from Type-D to Type-B participants, i.e. the Type-D
participants aim to split the gained trust ingredient from good participants, in return to rate back
to the good ones honestly. In this way, the trust ingredient propagated to Type-B participants
from Type-D participants declines by probability γ . Taking into account this, we redefine the trust
gradient for each Type-B participant as:
Tti (pB) = ND ·
1
NB
· (1 − γ ) ·Tti (PD )
= ND ·
1
NB
· (1 − γ ) · IH · 1+11+2 ·T
G
net
. (30)
In accordance, we rewrite the attack success condition (27) as:
ND ·
1
1+2 ·Tti (pD) + NB ·
1
1+2 ·Tti (pB) > NH ·
1+1
1+2 ·T
G
net
ND ·
1
1+2 · IH ·
1+1
1+2 ·T
G
net + NB ·
1
1+2 · ND ·
1
NB
· (1 − γ ) · IH · 1+11+2 ·T
G
net > NH ·
1+1
1+2 ·T
G
net
ND >
3NH
(2−γ )·IH
. (31)
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Table 2. Variables and parameters
TM NnH NdH NH RnH RdH TMnet T
G
net NC IH NB ND η γ
A v / h(1-19) v / 0.35 0.75, 0.85, 0.95 / / / / / /
B / v h(1-19) / v 0.35 0.75, 0.85, 0.95 / / / / / /
C / / 5, 10, 15 / v / / v h(1-19) / / / /
D / / 5, 10, 15 / v / / / h(1-19) v v / /
E / / 5, 10, 15 / v / / v h(1-19) / / 0.2 /
F / / 5, 10, 15 / v / / v h(1-19) v v / 0.2
v–observed value (vertical axis), h–observed value (horizon axis), /–variable inapplicable.
Therefore, the attack cost includes: i) Type-D participants’ amount is
(⌊
3NH
(2−γ )·IH
⌋
+ 1
)
, Type-B
participants’ amount is NB ; ii) Type-D participants need offer
(⌊
3NH
(2−γ )·IH
⌋
+ 1
)
· IH authentic ser-
vices; and iii) give
(⌊
3NH
(2−γ )·IH
⌋
+ 1
)
· NB dishonest ratings to Type-B participants; iv) Type-D and
Type-B participants need offer
((⌊
3NH
(2−γ )·IH
⌋
+ 1
)
+ NB
)
dishonest ratings to target participant; v)
based on the dishonest ratings given to attack target and Type-B participants, referring to probabil-
ityγ we can infer the total ratings offered byType-D participants are
(⌊(⌊
3NH
(2−γ )·IH
⌋
+ 1
)
· (1 + NB )/(1 − γ )
⌋
+ 1
)
,
the honest ratings are
(⌊ (⌊
3NH
(2−γ )·IH
⌋
+ 1
)
· (1 + NB ) · γ/(1 − γ )
⌋
+ 1
)
. Alike Threat Model D, the
number of Type-B participants does not affect the adverse effect of Type-D participants, they just
receive Type-D participants’ trust ingredient for launching more mischievous transactions.
4.3 Aack Behavior Analysis and Evaluation
We run a group of experiments to further analyze the six attack behaviors referring to Table 2,
wherein "TM" denotes threat models. The attack behavior is deeply analyzed through observing
the number (#) of mischievous participants and the number (#) of honest/dishonest ratings with
varying SMPs’ authentic services.
Fig. 1 shows the attack costs under Threat Models A-F. We can observe several interesting and
reasonable phenomena: i) for Threat Models A and B, since the mischievous participants cannot
offer authentic services to gain trust ingredient, the # of mischievous participants needed goes up
linearly as the honest ratings given by good participants increase, as well as the # of dishonest
ratings enlarges linearly; ii) as the # of authentic services enlarges in Threat Model C, both camou-
flage participants and dishonest ratings decline gradually. Due to the reinforced trust transitivity
of chain-based camouflage participants, it only needs one camouflage participant to provide au-
thentic services. The camouflage participants not only need provide dishonest ratings to target
participant, but they also need provide dishonest ratings to their partners along the chain, hence
the dishonest ratings are twice that of camouflage participants; iii) for Threat Model D, we set
Type-D participants and Type-B participants equally, although the amount of Type-B participants
does not affect the "trust ingredient" of Type-D group. We can observe from Fig. 1(c) that the
spy participants and dishonest ratings have a declining tendency as authentic services uploaded
by Type-D participants increase. However, apart from both Type-D and Type-B individuals give
target participant dishonest ratings, each Type-D participant would give all Type-B participants
dishonest (positive) ratings to promote trust ingredient. Therefore, the dishonest ratings are much
more than that in Threat Model C in which each camouflage participant only needs one dishonest
rating to build the chain. In addition, all Type-D participants need provide IH authentic services
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Fig. 1. Aack cost evaluation.
rather than only needing one individual. Thereby, the attack cost in Threat Model D is much
more than that in Threat Model C; iv) since the exponential function based trust propagation de-
riving from the honest ratings from camouflage participants to good ones in Threat Model E in
fact diminishes trust ingredient of the mischievous partners in the chain, this naturally requires
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Fig. 2. Transactional behaviors of SMPs.
more camouflage participants and dishonest/honest ratings compared with Threat Model C. Ow-
ing to log(1−η)(1 −
3NH ·η
IH
) must be subject to 0<1 − 3NH ·η
IH
<1 on the condition 0<(1-η)<1, we have
IH>3NH · η. Normally, since mischievous participants would not like to give honest ratings with
high probability η, we set η=0.2; v) since Threat Model F also exists "trust leakage", it needs more
attack cost compared with Threat Model D. We set γ=0.2 as well.
Upon the observation and analysis above, we can conclude the SMPs can indeed decrease attack
cost through providing authentic services. This also reveals the ground-truth that the mischievous
participants would pay more cost if they occasionally behave honestly rather than purely badly to
try to keep them undetected. This reflects the realistic behind reason whymischievous participants
are not willing to provide authentic services.
The above deduces the attack cost in theory, we next verify our argument through performing
a set of experiments using popular trust metrics: BetaTrust [Jøsang and Ismail 2002], EigenTrust
[Kamvar et al. 2003], ServiceTrust [Su et al. 2013] and ServiceTrust++ [Su et al. 2015]. To fairly eval-
uate the attack cost, we set same experiment environment as reported in EigenTrust [Kamvar et al.
2003], i.e., the experiment platform includes 60 good participants and 40 mischievous participants.
The total transaction number is set to be 10 times the system size, i.e. 1000 transactions. For Threat
Model C, the probability f is set as 0.4; besides f =0.4, the probability η in Threat Model E is set
as 0.2. In addition, the 40 mischievous participants are equally divided into Type-D and Type-B
participants in Threat Model D, the probability γ is set as 0.2 likewise in Threat Model F.
From Fig. 2, we observe that: i) the camouflage and spy participants gain high trust ingredient
through providing authentic services; on the other hand, they perform badly to offer inauthentic
services through aggregated global trust; ii) compared with the SMPs in Threat Models C and D,
the more-sophisticated mischievous participants in Threat Models E and F need to provide more
authentic services. For example, the numbers of authentic services provided by Threat Models
C and E are (483, 551) in BetaTrust, (578, 669) in EigenTrust, (122, 272) in ServiceTrust and (91,
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Table 3. Adverse behavior analysis and evaluation
Threat
Model
Mischievous
Participants
Mischievous
Ratings
Authentic
Services
Adverse
Effect
Trust
Transitivity
Defense
strategy
A linear linear none weak none easy
B linear linear none weak none easy
C medium small small mediocre existence solvable
D medium large large mediocre existence solvable
E medium small small strong existence difficult
F medium large large strong existence difficult
125) in ServiceTrust++; the numbers of authentic services provided by Threat Models D and F
are (1332, 1361), (777, 1070), (173, 902) and (164, 1039) respectively. This interprets the adverse
effect of Threat Models E and F is naturally larger than that of Threat Models C and D, i.e. the
more-sophisticated misbehavior participants own more opportunities to offer more inauthentic
services. For instance, the numbers of inauthentic services provided by Threat Models C and E are
(681, 758), (805, 1038), (162, 383) and (62, 149) in the four trust metrics; the numbers of inauthen-
tic services provided by Threat Models D and F are (774, 886), (1488, 1978), (183, 1211) and (173,
1147). Therefore, as analyzed previously, Threat Models E and F indeed need more attack cost and
simultaneously bring in more severe attack effect; iii) compared with the simple trust metrics Beta-
Trust [Jøsang and Ismail 2002] and EigenTrust [Kamvar et al. 2003], the feedback credibility-based
ServiceTrust [Su et al. 2013] and threshold-controlled trust metric ServiceTrust++ [Su et al. 2015]
could have a much better performance, especially under Threat Models C and D, although they
still suffer from the more-sophisticated misbehaviors in Threat Models E and F. Table 3 summa-
rizes and compares the six threat models in terms of attack cost, adverse effect, trust transitivity
and defense strategy.
5 VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF TRUST AGGREGATION MODELS
5.1 Trust Aggregation Principle
Trust aggregation in a decentralized network can be deemed as the fusion of feedback informa-
tion over a graph organized by various nodes (participants). It is naturally subject to two factors:
i) pairwise direct trust with local trust aggregation; and ii) trust propagation kernel-conducted
global trust aggregation. Apart from UDTP and TCTP, we add non-propagation (NP) kernel, i.e.
the global trust of a participant pi is aggregated through the direct trust placed on pi from the
neighboring participants plus the recommended trust by other participants. Thereby, trust met-
rics can be routinely categorized as six combinations with respect to two direct trust aggregation
fashions and three trust propagation kernels.
Definition 5.1 (Raw Direct Trust with Non-Propagation Kernel, RNP). Trust is aggregated using
the raw direct trust inferred from pairwise positive and negative ratings, the trust in fact only
captures 1-hop feedback information without trust propagation.
Definition 5.2 (Feedback Credibility-Weighted Direct Trust with Non-Propagation Kernel, CNP).
Trust is aggregated using FCW direct trust referring to feedback rater level credibility or feed-
back rating score level credibility, the trust only captures 1-hop feedback formation without trust
propagation.
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Fig. 3. Global trust of camouflage participants.
Definition 5.3 (Raw Direct Trust with Uniformly Distributed Trust Propagation Kernel, RUDP).
Trust is aggregated using the raw direct trust inferred from pairwise positive and negative rat-
ings, the trust captures k-hop (network-horizon) feedback information through UDTP kernel.
Definition 5.4 (Feedback Credibility-Weighted Direct Trust with Uniformly Distributed Trust Propa-
gation Kernel, CUDP). Trust is aggregated using FCW direct trust referring to feedback rater level
credibility or feedback rating score level credibility, the trust captures k-hop (network-horizon)
feedback information through UDTP kernel.
Definition 5.5 (Raw Direct Trust with Threshold-Controlled Trust Propagation Kernel, RTCP). Trust
is aggregated using the raw direct trust inferred from pairwise positive and negative ratings, the
trust in fact captures partial intended feedback information through TCTP kernel.
Definition 5.6 (Feedback Credibility-Weighted Direct trust with Threshold-Controlled Trust Propa-
gation Kernel, CTCP). Trust is aggregated using FCW direct trust referring to feedback rater level
credibility or feedback rating score level credibility, the trust in fact captures partial intended feed-
back information through TCTP kernel.
5.2 Aack Analysis of Reference Aggregation Models
To deeply study the pros and cons of reference trust aggregation models, we primarily select four
representative trust metrics to launch a set of experiments with two strategic Threat Models C
and E to exhibit how trust changes as iteration round increases: i) RUDP trust metric-EigenTrust
[Kamvar et al. 2003]; ii) feedback rater level credibility-based CUDP trust metric-PeerTrustTVM
[Xiong and Liu 2004]; iii) feedback rating score level credibility-based CUDP trustmetric-ServiceTrust
[Su et al. 2013]; iv) feedback rating score level credibility-based CTCP trust metric-ServiceTrust++
[Su et al. 2015]. In our experiments, we set the numbers of good, camouflage and pre-trusted partic-
ipants as 60, 40 and 3, f as 0.4 andη as 0.5. Fig. 3 exhibits the global trust of camouflage participants.
We randomly choose one camouflage participant to observe the variation tendency of global
trust with increasing the number of iteration rounds. In the presence of the Threat Model C, we ob-
serve that: i) in EigenTrust [Kamvar et al. 2003], the camouflage participant’s global trust enlarges
gradually as the number of iterations increases; ii) in PeerTrustTVM [Xiong and Liu 2004], the
global trust becomes large shortly within 5 iteration rounds. In contrast, in ServiceTrust [Su et al.
2013], the global trust goes up slowly. This is because PeerTrustTVM [Xiong and Liu 2004] can
promote the trust propagation from a camouflage participant to its partner along the chain, deriv-
ing from the high self-trust based feedback credibility weighted raw direct trust. In comparison,
ServiceTrust [Su et al. 2013] dramatically reduces the trust propagation from good participants to
camouflage ones by leveraging the dissimilarity between good and camouflage participants. This
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indicates that the rating similarity based credibility combined with the dissimilarity based trust
decaying in ServiceTrust [Su et al. 2013] is an effective mechanism to constrain the dishonest rat-
ings to propagate in the presence of camouflage participants; iii) in ServiceTrust++ [Su et al. 2015],
the global trust is always zero regardless what the specific iteration round is, this implies that
the TCTP kernel succeeds in cutting off trust transitivity paths/edges from good participants to
camouflage ones. The primary improvement of ServiceTrust++ [Su et al. 2015] over ServiceTrust
[Su et al. 2013] is the trust propagation kernel. Put differently, the UDTP kernel based ServiceTrust
[Su et al. 2013] cannot prevent the camouflage participants obtaining positive global trust, but the
TCTP kernel based ServiceTrust++ [Su et al. 2015] can throughout block trust propagation through
the system-inferred threshold.
From the results of Threat Model E, we observe the four representative trust metrics suffer
from this more-sophisticated attack behavior, even the feedback credibility-based trust metrics
and TCTP kernel-conducted trust metrics all become ineffective. The root-cause behind lies in
Threat Model E invalidates both FCW direct trust and TCTP kernel through making the good in
appearance but more-sophisticated mischievous participants imitate good participants as alike as
possible. In essence, the radical reasons as analyzed in work [Fan et al. 2017] lies in the pairwise
similarity has become inadequate to differentiate camouflage participants from good participants.
Next, we exhibit the inherent vulnerabilities through analyzing the attack behaviors of refer-
ence aggregation models in conjunction with transactional performance. We launch six groups
of experiments to study the fraction of failed transactions using several referral trust metrics:
i) random trust metric-NoneTrust; ii) RNP trust metric-BetaTrust [Jøsang and Ismail 2002]; iii)
RTCP trust metric-AdaptiveTrust [Chen et al. 2016], here we can recognize it as a RTCP trust
metric due to the setting of minimal honesty trust threshold (0.5) with time slot-based trust up-
date; iv) RUDP trust metric-EigenTrust [Kamvar et al. 2003]; v) CUDP trust metric-PeerTrustTVM
[Xiong and Liu 2004]; vi) CNP trust metric-PeerTrustPSM [Xiong and Liu 2004]; vii) CUDP trust
metric-ServiceTrust [Su et al. 2013]; and viii) CTCP trust metric-ServiceTrust++ [Su et al. 2015].
To keep experiment configuration identical, we set same environment as EigenTrust [Kamvar et al.
2003], i.e., the experiment platform has 100 participants and 3 pre-trusted participants. In Threat
Models A and B, the percentage of mischievous participants varies from 0 to 60%. In Threat Model
C, the f increases from 20% to 80%. In Threat Model D, 40 spy participants organize three combi-
nations: (10 Type-B, 30 Type-D), (20 Type-B, 20 Type-D), (30 Type-B, 10 Type-D). In Threat Model
E, we set the number of camouflage participants as 40 and keep f =0.4, then vary η from 0.2 to 0.8.
In Threat Model F, we divide the spy participants into 20 Type-B and 20 Type-D, then change γ
from 0.2 to 0.8. Fig. 4 exhibits the performance.
For Threat Models A and B, most trust metrics are effective deriving from the zero-value di-
rect trust from good individuals to mischievous ones, which leads to zero global trust for mis-
chievous participants, such as EigenTrust [Kamvar et al. 2003], PeerTrustTVM [Xiong and Liu
2004], PeerTrustPSM [Xiong and Liu 2004], ServiceTrust [Su et al. 2013] and ServiceTrust++ [Su et al.
2015]. However, apart from the random trust metric NoneTrust which randomly selects transacted
participants, the RTCP trust metric AdaptiveTrust [Chen et al. 2016] and RNP trust metric Beta-
Trust [Jøsang and Ismail 2002] cannot conquer the two simple attacks. In BetaTrust [Jøsang and Ismail
2002], since it derives trust using the difference between successful and unsuccessful transactions
without normalizing the direct trust into the interval [0, 1], thus, the mischievous participants can
obtain non-zero trust scores. Consequently, some mischievous participants might be selected as
transacted targets according to the probabilistic selection criterion. For AdaptiveTrust [Chen et al.
2016], it assumes each participant’s initial trust score as 0.5, thus the mischievous participants can
also be selected as transacted targets with a big probability, especially in the beginning stage the
difference of most participants’ trust is subtle.
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Fig. 4. Performance with Threat Models A-F.
For Threat Model C, the random, RNP, CNP, CUDP and RUDP trust metrics all become invalid
due to the existence of strategically mischievous behaviors of the camouflage participants, which
are acting as good participants at a certain probability f . For the CUDP trust metric PeerTrustTVM
[Xiong and Liu 2004] andCNP trustmetric PeerTrustPSM [Xiong and Liu 2004], they behave poorly
since both the feedback rater level credibility and feedback rating score level credibility cannot ef-
fectively prevent good participants to give direct trust on camouflage participants. However, Ser-
viceTrust [Su et al. 2013] uses the CUDP trust metric by employing the feedback rating score level
credibility to weight direct trust, which effectively decreases the direct trust from good partici-
pants to camouflage participants. In addition, with the CTCP trust metric, ServiceTrust++ [Su et al.
2015] can effectively cut off dishonest trust propagation to camouflage individuals even though the
direct trust weighted by feedback rating score level credibility is not dropped to the ground-truth
level (zero). Hence, the CTCP trust metric can effectively conquer strategic camouflage attack.
For Threat Model D, AdaptiveTrust [Chen et al. 2016] conquers, this is because there exists an
amending mechanism, i.e. once a participant finds another transacted participant gives a bad ser-
vice, then it sets this participant’s trust as 0.0. For CNP-based PeerTrustPSM [Xiong and Liu 2004]
and CUDP-based ServiceTrust [Su et al. 2013], they can conquer this kind of spy attack since the
similarity-inferred feedback credibility approaches are effective to decline the trust of purely mis-
chievous Type-B participants deriving from the total dissimilarity between good participants and
spy participants. In ServiveTrust++ [Su et al. 2015], both the feedback rating score level credibility
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and controlled trust propagation kernel doubly constrain these spy participants’ trust aggrega-
tion. However, for the RNP-based BetaTrust [Jøsang and Ismail 2002], RUDP-based EigenTrust
[Kamvar et al. 2003] and CUDP-based PeerTrustTVM [Xiong and Liu 2004], they all suffer from
this spy attack. BetaTrust [Jøsang and Ismail 2002] and EigenTrust [Kamvar et al. 2003] would as-
sign high trust scores to Type-D participants. Type-D participants can manipulate PeerTrustTVM
[Xiong and Liu 2004] through the high feedback rater level credibility. In summary, the adequate
feedback credibility, supported in PeerTrustPSM [Xiong and Liu 2004], ServiceTrust [Su et al. 2013]
and ServiceTrust++ [Su et al. 2015], can effectively control and block the direct trust from good par-
ticipants to spy participants.
For Threat Model E, all the trust metrics suffer from this more-sophisticated adversary behav-
ior, even the CUDP-based ServiceTrust [Su et al. 2013] and CTCP-based ServiceTrust++ [Su et al.
2015] cannot resist in spite of a better performance compared with other trust metrics. This is
because the tremendously similar transactional behavior between camouflage participants with
probabilistically honest ratings and good participants makes the trust metrics become extremely
difficult to distinguish these good in appearance but mischievous participants. Singly from the
viewpoint of direct trust aggregation, it is hard to degrade the raw direct trust or FCW direct trust,
not to mention the trust propagation kernels. Compared to the raw direct trust and inadequate
FCW direct trust, such as AdaptiveTrust [Chen et al. 2016], BetaTrust [Jøsang and Ismail 2002],
EigenTrust [Kamvar et al. 2003] and PeerTrustTVM [Xiong and Liu 2004], the adequate FCW di-
rect trust can make the ratio of failed transactions decline to some extent, such as PeerTrustPSM
[Xiong and Liu 2004], ServiceTrust [Su et al. 2013] and ServiceTrust++ [Su et al. 2015].
For Threat Model F, apart from AdaptiveTrust [Chen et al. 2016] with amending mechanism, all
other trust metrics suffer from this more-sophisticated spy misbehavior as well. The fundamental
reason also lies in these spy participants behave almost alike as good participants to a large extend
through adjusting the probability of offering honest ratings.
5.3 Summary of Aack Analysis
Upon the attack analysis above, we can conclude that: i) for independently and collectively ma-
licious behaviors in Threat Models A and B, the raw direct trust or FCW direct trust can be an
effective fashion as transaction enlarges, accordingly the aggregated trust levels can differentially
represent good and mischievous participants using whatever NP, UDTP or TCTP kernels; ii) for
strategic camouflage and spy behaviors in Threat Models C and D, the raw direct trust becomes
ineffective. The adequate FCW direct trust becomes valid to a large extent but cannot throughout
constrain the trust propagation from good to the camouflage and spy participants into ground-true
level. If TCTP kernel can be employed to control how to propagate/block trust among different cat-
egories of participants, the trust metrics would be effective. That is to say a reliable trust metric
needs to employ an adequate FCW direct trust plus an appropriate TCTP kernel to resist camou-
flage and spy attacks; iii) for more-sophisticated mischievous participants in Threat Models E and
F, considering the extremely similar transactional behavior with good participants, it is hard to
defend due to high similarity-inferred feedback credibility, in addition to the invalid similarity-
inferred threshold. Thereby, even the adequate FCW direct trust and TCTP kernel cannot conquer
these more-sophisticated attacks, but can decline the trust levels of camouflage and spy partici-
pants to an extent.
To further dig out the root-causes why diverse categories of trust metrics suffer from the more-
sophisticated camouflage and spy attacks, we utilize the real-word interactive network-Epinions
to launch a group of experiments to unveil the behind reasons. We add 30 nodes into the 100
regular/good nodes organized Epinions network, recognizing the 30 added nodes as strategically
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Fig. 5. Pairwise Similarity under Threat Model E.
mischievous nodes with Threat Models E and F. For regular nodes, we straightly adopt Zipf distri-
bution to assign pairwise edge weight (direct trust) for each pair of connected nodes. The regular
nodes select a decimal from interval [0.85, 1.0] to rate the added camouflage nodes, and the added
nodes select a decimal from interval [η-0.05, η+0.05] to rate regular nodes under Threat Model E.
Fig. 5 exhibits the pairwise similarity among the 130 nodes wherein 100 nodes (ID=1-100) belong
to regular nodes, 30 nodes (ID=101-130) pertain to mischievous nodes. The experimental results
interpret the pairwise similarity between camouflage and good nodes gradually increases as the η
enlarges from 30% to 90%. The similarity between camouflage and goodnodes is almost in the same
level between good nodes themselves when η is up to 90%. This indicates when η is large enough
the similarity-based feedback credibility becomes invalid to degrade raw direct trust from good
to camouflage nodes, as well as the similarity-based threshold becomes invalid to block dishonest
trust propagation owning to high similarity-based direct trust. Similar results can be also obtained
under Threat Model F while extending the γ step by step. This reveals our proposed Threat Mod-
els E and F can indeed make the more-sophisticated mischievous participants behave extremely
similarly as good ones, making them become extremely difficult to defend.
To explicitly illuminate the features of the state of the art trust metrics, we categorize them into
six communities to sketch the weakness and attack resilience with respect to the six threat models
in Tables 4-9. THR_A-F denotes Threat Models A-F, "+" denotes trust metric can conquer threat
model, "-" oppositely indicates trust metric cannot.
RNP-based Trust Metrics.Marti et al. [2004] proposed a voting reputation system wherein a
node q would contact a set of nodes Res for their own local opinion on the responder r , wherein
the final reputation was calculated by summing each voter’s rating in addition to the node q’s
own feedback rating. Jøsang et al. [2006] defined the target Z ’s reputation score at time t as
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Table 4. Aack Analysis on RNP-based Trust Metrics
Trust Metrics
Defense Countermeasure
THR_A THR_B THR_C THR_D THR_E THR_F
Marti et al. [2004] + + - - - -
Jøsang et al. [2006] + + - - - -
TrustWalker [2009] + + + + - -
Wang et al. [2009] + + - - - -
Liu et al. [2011] + + + + - -
Li et al. [2012] + + - - - -
CommTrust [2014] + + - - - -
Shabut et al. [2015] + + + + - -
Table 5. Aack Analysis on CNP-based Trust Metrics
Trust Metrics
Defense Countermeasure
THR_A THR_B THR_C THR_D THR_E THR_F
PeerTrustPSM [2004] + + - + - -
TrustGauard [2005] + + - - - -
Yu et al. [2008] + + + + - -
Li and Zhu [2014] + + + + - -
DCMR [2009] + + + + - -
Rt (Z ) = (δ + 2a)/(δ + σ + 2), where δ and σ denoted the numbers of positive and negative obser-
vations, and a expressed a prior or base rate to leverage the weight of positive rating. TrustWalker
[Jamali and Ester 2009] estimated the rating for user u on target item i using different random
walks, it summed the feedback information returned by different k-scoped random walks as the
rating for the source user u on the target item i . Wang et al. [2009] straightly defined the final
trust of node i toward node j in d field as the integration of local trust value Li jd and global
trust value Tjd with a proportional factor. Liu et al. [2011] utilized the first-hop of trust transi-
tivity Ta1,a2 and the hop number to infer trust transitivity result Ta1,a(j+1) for a social trust path
p(a1, ...,a(j+1)) as Ta1,a(j+1)= Ta1,a2+k2, where k2 denoted the slope of Deviation Line referring to
the Base Line that started from coordination (1, Ta1,a2). Li et al. [2012] utilized local trust degree
(LTD) DL(Ni ,Nj ) placed on node Nj from node Ni and feedback trust degree (FTD) RU (Ni , Nj )
from the third-party nodes which had interactions with Nj to aggregate global trust. CommTrust
[Zhang et al. 2014] defined the overall trust score T for a seller as the weighted aggregation of di-
mension trust scores, i.eT =
∑m
d=1 td ·wd , where td andwd represented the trust score and weight
for the dimension d (d=1, ...,m). Then it utilized the beta function-based expectation to calculate
trust score td = (|{vd = +1}| +m/2)/(n +m), where n={vd |vd = +1 ∨ vd = −1}| was the binary
positive and negative ratings. Shabut et al. [2015] adopted the direct and indirect trust to aggregate
trust scoreTi j for nodes i and j , i.e.Ti j = wd ·Tdi j +wi ·T
i
i j , wherewd+wi=1. The direct and indirect
trust were inferred by the beta function-based expectation.
CNP-basedTrustMetrics.The personalized similarity was utilized to calculate feedback credi-
bility of third-party recommenders in PeerTrustPSM [Xiong and Liu 2004], TrustGauard [Srivatsa et al.
2005] and Yu et al. [2008]. Li and Zhu [2014] also utilized the cosine-based similarity as credibility
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Table 6. Aack Analysis on RUDP-based Trust Metrics
Trust Metrics
Defense Countermeasure
THR_A THR_B THR_C THR_D THR_E THR_F
SocialTrust [2010] + + - - - -
SORT [2013] + + + + - -
GFTrust [2016b] + + - - - -
PageTrust [2008] + + - - - -
EigenTrust [2003] + + - - - -
PowerTrust [2007] + + - - - -
Guha et al. [2004] + + - - - -
Dual-EigenRep [2010] + + - - - -
Walter et al. [2009] + + - - - -
for recommendation in body area networks. DCMR [Bao et al. 2009] employed the similar users’
similarity as the credibility to calculate the rating on an item in collaborative filtering.
RUDP-based Trust Metrics. SocialTrust [Caverlee et al. 2010] inferred a user i’s trust from
the trust and relationship quality R(j) of other users, as well as the number of user j’s relation-
ship, i.e. Trq(i) = λ
∑
j∈rel
R(j) ·Trq(j)/|rel(j)| + (1 − λ)F (i), where rel(j) denoted the set of contacts
of user j , F (i) represented the feedback rating aggregated by the trust group governing assess-
ment. The relationship quality R(j) was a scoped random walk. SORT [Can and Bhargava 2013]
defined participant pi ’s estimation about the reputation of pj through collecting all recommen-
dation trust from its acquaintance pk , namely eri j =
∑
pk ∈Ti
(rtik · ηk j · rk j ), where ηk j was the
number of pk ’s acquaintances which provided recommendations during the calculation of rk j , rtik
denoted the recommendation trust from pk , and Ti was the set of trustworthy acquaintances se-
lected by pi . GFTrust [Jiang et al. 2016b] mirrored trust propagation from nodes s to d as net-
work flow with intermediate node vi in the path (s,v1, ...,vm,d), i.e. when a flow f lw passed
this path, the resulting flow would become f lw ·
∏
i ∈[1,m] (1 − leak(vi )), where leak(vi ) denoted
the flow leakage function. PageRank [Page et al. 1999] is the pioneering page ranking algorithm
through propagating rank value from one page to its neighboring page(s) along the hyperlink or
randomly to another non-hyperlinked page with a probability, it’s a typically UDTP. On the basis
of PageRank, PageTrust [Kerchove and Dooren 2008] was proposed to infer the trust value for each
page. EigenTrust [Kamvar et al. 2003] adopted PageRank into trust management and accomplished
UDTP through replacing the degree-based pairwise weight with the ratio of satisfied interactions.
The similar manipulations also emerged in PowerTrust [Zhou and Hwang 2007], Dual-EigenRep
[Fan et al. 2010] and Guha et al. [2004]. Walter et al. [2009] calculated indirect trust via iterative
computation of local trust matrix, the kth power of matrix represented the hops of UDTP.
CUDP-basedTrustMetrics.PeerTrustTVM [Xiong and Liu 2004] employed each participant’s
trust ratio as feedback credibility to indicate how much trust it could propagate to its neighbor(s)
using UDTP kernel. For a pair of participants, Hu et al. [2008] defined feedback credibility by mul-
tiplying their transaction density factor and difference of ratings, then aggregated global trust
through power-iteration-based matrix computation. EigenTrust++ [Fan et al. 2012] utilized the
pairwise similarity as feedback credibility to weight raw direct trust for further global trust ag-
gregation via UDTP kernel. ServiceTrust [Su et al. 2013] defined positive similarity and negative
similarity to merge the feedback credibility, subsequently aggregated global trust via UDTP kernel.
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Table 7. Aack Analysis on CUDP-based Trust Metrics
Trust Metrics
Defense Countermeasure
THR_A THR_B THR_C THR_D THR_E THR_F
PeerTrustTVM [2004] + + - - - -
Hu et al. [2008] + + + + - -
EigenTrust++ [2012] + + + + - -
ServiceTrust [2013] + + + + - -
Deng et al. [2017] + + + + - -
Table 8. Aack Analysis on RTCP-based Trust Metrics
Trust Metrics
Defense Countermeasure
THR_A THR_B THR_C THR_D THR_E THR_F
Chen et al. [2008] + + + - + -
Wang and Li [2011] + + - - - -
ReTrust [2012] + + - - - -
Chen et al. [2014] + + +/- +/- +/- +/-
AdaptiveTrust [2016] + + +/- + +/- +
Deng et al. [2017] associated the preference similarity to model trust degree for a pair of users. If
no direct link existed, then the shortest path-based multiplication was adopted.
RTCP-based Trust Metrics. Chen et al. [2008] proposed an inter-cluster recommendation
trust concept and defined the total trust index from node Ni to Nj as Γ(Ni ,Nj ) = αT
i j
D
+ βT
j
R
,
α , β ≥ 0, α + β=1, where α and β were the impact weights of direct trust T i jD and recommen-
dation trust T j
R
respectively. The inter-cluster recommendation trust for Nj was defined as T
j
R
=∑n
i=1T
hi
D
·T
i j
D
/
∑n
i=1T
hi
D
, where Thi
D
>H , this condition indicated the cluster head (CH) would dis-
card their recommendation to save bandwidth if the node’s direct trust by CH was lower than
a threshold value H . Wang and Li [2011] calculated the aggregated rating by adopting Gaussian
distribution-based upper control limit and lower control limit to filter out the marginal ratings out
of the range of boundary. ReTrust [He et al. 2012] utilized the similar range to block bad-mouthing
recommendation, in addition to the indirect trust inference through trust propagation with the re-
quirement that all direct trust between intermediate nodes must be greater than a threshold. Chen
et al. [2014] used a threshold to select trustworthy recommenders to infer indirect trust, in addi-
tion to the consideration the trust between the originator node and recommender as a weight to
multiply the recommendation trust. In AdaptiveTrust [Chen et al. 2016], the authors set a minimal
honesty trust threshold (0.5) during time slot-based trust update.
CTCP-basedTrustMetrics. Song et al. [2005] utilized threshold-controlled selected local trust
score tji placed on i from another participant j and corresponding aggregation weight to calculate
the global trust, theweight was aggregated by the participant j’s trust, transaction date and amount.
Consider participant j’s trust was under the computation simultaneously, therefore, the procedure
of global trust in fact was a multiple iterations, which implied the trust was propagated through
threshold-controlled edges. O’Donovan and Smyth [2005] qualified which producer profiles were
allowed to participate the rating recommendation process through predefining a threshold with
which the item/profile-level trust values of candidate producer profiles compared, besides this, the
qualified profiles also needed to take the harmonicmean of trust and similarity as recommendation
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Table 9. Aack Analysis on CTCP-based Trust Metrics
Trust Metrics
Defense Countermeasure
THR_A THR_B THR_C THR_D THR_E THR_F
Song et al. [2005] + + - - - -
O’Donovan and Smyth [2005] + + + + - -
ServiveTrust++ [2015] + + + + - -
GroupTrust [2017] + + + + - -
credibility to infer the rating for an item in a consumer profile. ServiveTrust++ [Su et al. 2015] em-
ployed the similarity as feedback credibility to weight the raw direct trust, in addition that a thresh-
old over the holistic network was set to control the trust propagation. GroupTrust [Fan et al. 2017]
utilized the exponent-based feedback credibility, and proposed a fine-grained threshold-controlled
trust propagation through studying the susceptible-infected-recovered model.
6 DESIGN PRINCIPLES OF DECENTRALIZED TRUST MANAGEMENT
Based on the formal analysis and experimental evaluation presented, we make three important
observations and articulate the three design principles for effective trust management.
(1) Different threat modes have different adverse effects and different attack costs. ThreatModels
E and F have muchmore serious adverse effect than Threat Models A, B, C, D, because such attacks
make it more difficult to differentiate mischievous participants from good participants in terms of
both service provisioning or feedback rating behaviors. Thus, the robustness of decentralized trust
management should be based on establishing trust by identifying both the list of priorities in terms
of a range of services and the measurement for the service quality. In this paper we only cover the
request serving and feedback rating as two types of services.We use the feedback rating tomeasure
the request serving quality and we leverage feedback similarity as a way to measure feedback
rating quality, which are vulnerable under the most strategically malicious Thread Models E and
F.
(2) The feedback credibility-weighted local trust aggregation can effectively regulate the dis-
honest ratings when the fraction of malicious participants is much smaller than the fraction of
good participants. However, the effectiveness of using the similarity based feedback credibility
for regulating the local trust aggregation may no longer be effective when the fraction of good
participants is out-numbered by the fraction of mischievous participants. This observation further
indicates the importance of developing trust management algorithms that can tolerate unexpected
errors and survive unexpected malicious attacks.
(3) The threshold controlled trust-propagation (TCTP) kernel provides the double-filtered func-
tion to regulate the trust propagation from good participants to the malicious participants. This
enables the global trust scores of mischievous participants to be dramatically decreased, providing
flexibility to control how trust is partially propagated over the network of participants through
topological traversal. Thus, the TCTP kernel presents a more appropriate defense against those
strategicallymischievous attacks comparedwith the uniformly distributed trust propagation (UDTP)
kernel.
7 APPLICATION PROSPECT
Edge Computing Trust. One of the main attractions of edge computing is to improve the compu-
tation and processing cost and time by leveraging edge nodes instead of always connecting to the
remote Cloud servers. Porambage et al. [2018] pointed out "trust" as a significant mechanism in
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critical 5G use cases like remote surgeries, emergency autonomous vehicles, factory automation
and tele-operated driving (e.g. drones). Several recent efforts have articulated the need to design
appropriate trust management for edge cloud. Yan et al. [2014] articulated the role of trust man-
agement for reliable data fusion and mining, qualified services with context-awareness, and for
enhancing user privacy and information security. Dang and Hoang [2017] demonstrated the use
of trust management for data protection and performance improvement at edge servers. Garcia et
al. [2015] also presented the challenges for trust, security and privacy in edge-centric computing.
Trust management in Blockchain Systems. Blockchain technique [Nakamoto 2008] em-
ploys a decentralized P2P network to achieve consensus on a distributed public ledger of transac-
tions through calculating the proofs of work for different peers (miners). The representative appli-
cation of blockchain is the Bitcoin system. Users in the Bitcoin system are anonymous, and can use
their public key hash as their pseudo-identity to interact with the system. However, the blockchain
and the miner still confront some transactional risks at present, such as the double-spending
problem and selfish mining problem [Eyal and Sirer 2018; Heilman et al. 2015; Karame et al. 2015;
Zhang et al. 2019].
One approach to mitigate such risks is to incorporate trust management into the peer to peer
network of the blockchain system. For instance, consider the private blockchain and consortium
blockchain scenarios, assume a service consumer u needs to pay a certain number of bitcoins
to a service provider v using its address au . If the transaction is successfully accomplished, i.e.
user v receives bitcoins indeed from user u, then user v will provide a positive rating to user u ′s
address au , otherwise a negative rating if the payment does not accomplish successfully, i.e. user
v does not receive bitcoins from user u. Based on the feedback rating information, the blockchain
system can produce a trust score for each anonymous address through employing our previously-
introduced trust metrics, i.e. yield an overall estimation on the trustworthiness for each address.
In subsequent transactions, service consumers can select the addresses with high trust scores as
transacted targets, which can effectively block the transactions from the potentially-mischievous
addresses with low trust scores, accordingly decline the risk of unsuccessful transactions.
The pull-in trust management can bring in two-facet advantages: i) keep the anonymity and
un-traceability of users; and ii) guarantee the trustworthiness of transactional behaviors among
users. The above is to rate the anonymous address, furthermore, we can also rate the user u with
multiple addresses. Taking into account the linkability between addresses and users [Karame et al.
2015; Meiklejohn et al. 2013], i.e. identify the ownership of different addresses for users, we can
straightly accumulate the positive and negative ratings tomultiple addresses offered by other users
with which user u has had transactions, and aggregate a comprehensive trust score for user u.
BlockchainbasedTrustManagement.Trust scores and feedback ratings are important pieces
of data that should be carefully protected in any trust management system. Blockchain technol-
ogy can be utilized as an excellent mechanism to keep track of trust ratings and store them in the
public and secure global ledger, such that a trust rating score once admitted into the blockchain, it
will be absolutely secure from malicious modification and compromises. We argue that this is an
interesting research and development project with high practical relevance.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
Wedescribe decentralized trust managementmodels and their efficiency and robustness from three
unique perspectives. First, we study the risk factors and adverse effects of six common threat
models. Second, we review the representative trust aggregation models and trust metrics. Third,
we present an in-depth analysis and comparison of these reference trust aggregation methods
with respect to effectiveness and robustness. We argue that our comparative study advances the
understanding of adverse effects of present and future threats and the robustness of different trust
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metrics. It may also serve as a guideline for research and development of next generation trust
aggregation algorithms and services in the anticipation of risk factors and mischievous threats.
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